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Abstract
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brow-
nian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping
and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean field equilib-
rium and it is shown to be the limit of associated n-player games. Conversely, the mean
field strategy induces n-player ε-Nash equilibria for any continuous reward function—
but not for discontinuous ones. In a second part, we study the problem of a principal
who can choose how to distribute a reward budget over the ranks and aims to maxi-
mize the performance of the median player. The optimal reward design (contract) is
found in closed form, complementing the merely partial results available in the n-player
case. We then analyze the quality of the mean field design when used as a proxy for
the optimizer in the n-player game. Surprisingly, the quality deteriorates dramatically
as n grows. We explain this with an asymptotic singularity in the induced n-player
equilibrium distributions.
Keywords Mean Field Game; Stochastic Contest; Optimal Contract; Stackelberg Game
AMS 2020 Subject Classification 91A13; 91A65; 91A15
1 Introduction
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian
motion with drift and absorption at the origin. Players are ranked according to their level
of stopping and paid a reward which is a decreasing function of the rank. This is an
infinite-player version of the n-player game studied in [32] which in turn extends the Seel–
Strack model [36] where only the top-ranked player receives a reward. First, we establish
existence and uniqueness of a mean field equilibrium for any given reward function. Second,
we solve the problem of optimal reward design (optimal contract) for a principal who can
choose how to distribute a given reward budget over the ranks and aims to maximize the
performance (i.e., stopping level) at a given rank, for instance the median performance
among the players. An analogous problem was studied for the n-player case in [32], but only
a partial characterization of the optimal design is available. Here, taking the mean field
limit enables a clear-cut answer.
The present work also serves as a case study: from the perspective of mean field analysis,
a particular feature of this game is to be tractable without necessarily being smooth. Atoms
occur naturally in the equilibrium distribution, but the mean field game nevertheless admits
an equilibrium that can be described in closed form, and we can prove analytically that the
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equilibrium is unique. As the n-player equilibrium can also be described in detail, we can
observe the quality of the mean field approximation, not only for the mean field game (with
fixed reward function) but also for the reward design problem—which is a Stackelberg game
between the principal and a continuum of players. It turns out that this case study offers a
cautionary tale.
In the n-player setting, the Seel–Strack model has been generalized and varied in several
directions: more general diffusion processes [19], random initial laws [20], heterogeneous loss
constraints [35], behavioral players [21]. See also [18, 32] for references to other models on
risk-taking under relative performance pay, and [38] for an introduction to rank-order prize
allocation. The novelty in the present work is to analyze a mean field model along the lines
of Seel–Strack and its optimal design problem; we focus on the original Brownian dynamics.
For the theory and applications of mean field games, the monographs [4, 8, 9] provide an
excellent overview and references. The very recent mean field model [1] can be related to the
first part of this work. In [1], players control the volatility of a Brownian motion up to an
independent exponential time and are then ranked. The reward is one above a certain rank
and zero below. As the horizon is exponential and volatilities can only be chosen within an
interval that is bounded and bounded away from zero, the model has a smooth equilibrium
and the distinct features of the present work do not appear. (Questions of optimal design, or
reward functions other than the binary one, are not studied.) Contracts between a principal
and n agents have been analyzed in [23], among many others. Closer to the present work,
[16] studies optimal contracts between a principal and infinitely agents, using the theory of
mean field games for diffusion control.
Mean Field Equilibrium. The mean field game as formalized in Section 2 admits an
equilibrium as soon as the reward function R is right-continuous and a natural integrability
condition on the drift parameter holds (the latter is also present in the n-player game). The
equilibrium stopping distribution can be described in closed form using the right-continuous
inverse of y 7→ R(1 − y); cf. Theorem 2.2. Once the correct Ansatz is guessed, the exis-
tence result is reduced to a verification proof following a direct martingale argument. The
uniqueness result is more involved, in part because—in contrast to the n-player game and
many other mean field models—atoms in the equilibrium cannot be excluded; in fact, the
closed-form solution already indicates that atoms will arise unless R is strictly monotone.
The first part of the proof (Section 3.1) relates flat stretches in reward to atoms in any
potential equilibrium distribution. The basic idea is to show, a priori, that equal pay must
correspond to equal performance: ranks with the same reward are occupied by players that
stop at the same level, and vice versa. On the other hand, jumps in reward are related to
gaps in the support of the equilibrium distribution. The second part of the uniqueness proof
(Section 3.2) is based on the idea that in any equilibrium, the opposing players collectively
act such as to minimize the value function of a given representative player. This approach
enables an analytic proof using optimal stopping theory and dynamic programming argu-
ments: using the additional constraints shown in the first part, the minimization is shown to
have a unique solution, proving uniqueness of the equilibrium. This analysis is complicated
by the presence of atoms. We remark that a similar uniqueness proof could be given for the
n-player game, in which case it would simplify substantially because atoms can be excluded
a priori (however, a different proof is already available).
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Optimal Reward Design. In the n-player game, [32] studied the design problem for
a principal maximizing the performance at the k-th rank; for example, maximizing the
revenue in a second-best auction, or the median performance among employees, customers,
students, etc. To consider the analogue in the mean field limit, we replace the k-th rank
by the quantile α = k/n, for instance α = 0.5 for the median player. A reasonable guess
for the optimal reward design is to (a) pay nothing to the ranks below the target α and (b)
distribute the reward budget uniformly over the ranks above. We show in Theorem 4.1 that
this guess is correct, for any value of the drift parameter. By contrast, the guess is wrong in
the finite player game: for nonnegative drift, the general shape is correct, but the optimal
cut-off point can be at a rank strictly below the target rank k. For negative drift, the sharp
cut-off can be replaced by a smoothed shape which also pays a small number of rewards
of different sizes. (A full characterization of the optimal reward is only available for zero
drift; cf. [32].) Again, the mean field limit proves useful in allowing for a fuller description
and a clearer result. On the other hand, knowing only the mean field limit may suggest an
over-simplified picture for the finite player game. One previous model where the optimal
reward design problem was solved completely for both n-player and mean field setting, is the
Poissonian game of [31] where players control the jump intensity and are ranked according
to their jump times. There, the optimal designs are more similar between the two settings;
part (a) of the above guess is always correct—the optimal reward has a sharp cut-off exactly
at the target rank—though the shape over the ranks above the target is concave rather than
being flat as in (b). A related mean field game is considered in [3], with diffusion instead
of Poissonian dynamics. Both (a) and (b) turn out to be correct in the mean field setting.
The n-player game is not tractable and its optimal design was not studied. In the light of
the present work, one should not take for granted that the shape is analogous to the mean
field limit.
Mean Field Approximation. In the above discussion, the mean field model is formu-
lated directly as a game with infinitely many players. To connect this model rigorously with
the n-player game, we show in Theorem 5.1 that for any given reward function, the unique
n-player equilibrium for the induced reward converges to the mean field counterpart. More-
over, the value function of a player in the n-player game converges locally uniformly to the
value function in the mean field game. This way of connecting the two models is classical
in the mean field game literature starting with [28]; see in particular [2, 6, 10, 22, 26, 27].
Another way of connecting the two models, going back to [25], is to fix the optimal strategy
from the mean field equilibrium and consider it in the n-player game for large n. Consistent
with a broad literature (among others, [5, 7, 10, 11, 12]), we show in Theorem 5.4 that for
any continuous reward function, this control induces an ε-Nash equilibrium for large n; that
is, players cannot improve their expected performance by more than ε through unilateral
deviations from the mean field strategy. Surprisingly, continuity is necessary: any disconti-
nuity in the reward function is shown to rule out the ε-Nash equilibrium property for large n.
A discontinuity in reward leads to a gap in the support of the mean field equilibrium dis-
tribution. Due to a knife-edge phenomenon in the sampling for large but finite n, a player
can improve substantially by unilaterally stopping inside the gap with a well-chosen distri-
bution. In the study of diffusive mean field games with absorption, [5, Section 7] described
an example with degenerate volatility where the ε-Nash equilibrium property fails. The
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degeneracy is exogenously chosen so that absorption cannot occur in the n-player game, but
will occur in the mean field game, therefore creating a disconnect between the two. In [1],
on the other hand, the ε-Nash equilibrium property always holds, despite the reward being
discontinuous, because the dynamics of the game itself (nondegenerate volatility) guarantee
a smooth equilibrium. The models of [13, 14, 30, 29] highlighted a different type of discrep-
ancy where some mean field equilibria can fail to be limits of n-player equilibria. Those
examples arise due to non-uniqueness of mean field equilibria, thus are orthogonal to the
issues in the present work.
Next, we discuss the quality of the mean field approximation for the reward design
problem (Section 5.3); here using the mean field proxy seems particularly attractive because
the optimal n-player design was fully solved only for zero drift. Our numerical discussion
uses the zero drift case, for that same reason. We observe that the optimal design for the n-
player problem converges to the mean field counterpart. Moreover, the induced performance
of the former in the n-player game converges to the performance of the latter in the mean
field game. This is consistent with [16], where the authors prove convergence of the optimal
designs and induced performances for an example of their diffusive game—which is much
more complex, yet smoother, than ours. But more importantly, and maybe surprisingly, the
quality of the mean field proxy from the point of view of the principal is strikingly poor in
the present model (this aspect was not studied in [16]): for moderate n, the performance
induced by the mean field optimizer is significantly inferior to the exact n-player optimal
design. For large n, the performance deteriorates even further, eventually achieving only
50% of the optimum. The tractability of the present model allows us to explain the reason
for this phenomenon in detail. In the literature, mean field approximations are often applied
in finite-player games without further analysis. The present study may offer the message
that the quality of the approximation warrants consideration, especially when smoothness
is not guaranteed, and that the mean field model can yield an oversimplified picture of the
n-player game in some cases.
2 Mean Field Equilibrium
In this section we define the mean field contest as a game with a continuum of players and
prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. It will be shown in Section 5 that this
equilibrium is indeed the limit of associated n-player games as n→ ∞. Throughout, we fix
a reward function, defined as a right-continuous and decreasing1 function R : [0, 1] → R+
satisfying R(0) > R(1−) = R(1). It will be shown in Remarks 2.4 and 3.4, respectively,
that left-continuity at the last rank is essential for uniqueness of the equilibrium whereas
right-continuity is essential for existence.
Each infinitesimal player i privately observes a drifted Brownian motion Xit = x0+µt+
σW it with absorption at x = 0 and chooses a (possibly randomized) stopping time τi < ∞.
The initial value x0 ∈ (0,∞), drift µ ∈ R and dispersion σ ∈ (0,∞) are identical across
players whereas the Brownian motions are independent. Let Yi = X
i
τi be the position at
stopping. If Yi are i.i.d. across players with law F , the empirical distribution of (Yi) is a.s.
equal to F , by the Exact Law of Large Numbers (cf. Remark 2.5). That is, if all players
1Increase and decrease are understood in the non-strict sense in this paper.
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choose the same stopping distribution, then the collection of players (deterministically) ends
up distributed accordingly. Hence the rank of player i if she stops at x while all other players
stop according to distribution F , is defined as 1− F (x).2 If F does not have an atom at x,
meaning that there are no ties at this rank, she receives the reward R(1−F (x)). Otherwise
she receives the average of R(1− y) over y ∈ [F (x−), F (x)], which is equivalent to splitting
ties uniformly at random. Thus, writing
g(y) := R(1− y),
the payoff ξF (x) for stopping at x if all other players use F is
ξF (x) =
{




F (x−) g(y)dy if F (x) > F (x−).
(2.1)
The set F of distributions that are feasible, i.e., can be attained by stopping Xi with
a randomized stopping time, is characterized through Skorokhod’s embedding theorem and
the scale function h of X := Xi, as observed in [36].
Lemma 2.1. The set F consists of all distributions F on [0,∞) satisfying
∫
hdF = 1 if
µ > 0 and
∫
hdF ≤ 1 if µ ≤ 0, respectively, where


















if µ 6= 0,
x
x0
if µ = 0.
(2.2)
This result is due to to [24].3 We say that F ∈ F is a mean field equilibrium if no




ξF dF̃ for all F̃ ∈ F . The
associated value function u(x) is defined as the supremum expected reward achievable for a
player starting at level x (instead of x0) if all others use F . Denote the average reward by
R̄ =
∫ 1










In the following result, g−1 denotes the right -continuous inverse
g−1(z) = inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : g(y) > z} for z ∈ [R(1), R(0)), g−1(R(0)) := 1.
Theorem 2.2. Let µ < µ̄∞. There exists a unique equilibrium. Its cdf is
F ∗(x) = g−1
(
[R(1) + (R̄−R(1))h(x)] ∧R(0)
)
, (2.3)
where g−1 is the right-continuous inverse of g, and the equilibrium value function is
u∗(x) = [R(1) + (R̄−R(1))h(x)] ∧R(0).
In particular, the equilibrium has compact support [0, x̄] for x̄ = h−1(R(0)−R(1)
R̄−R(1)
) and its atoms
are in one-to-one correspondence with intervals where the reward R is constant.
2We use the same symbol for the distribution and its cdf when there is no danger of confusion. Note that
if F has an atom at x, many players may share the same rank.
3See [33, Section 9] for general background and a derivation. The extension to the present case with
absorbing boundary is immediate.
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Remark 2.3. The equilibrium distribution (2.3) is invariant under affine transformations
of the reward R. In particular, we may normalize the reward to satisfy R(1) = 0 and R̄ = 1
without loss of generality.
Remark 2.4. The condition R(1−) = R(1) is not necessary for the existence result in
Theorem 2.2 (it is not used in the proof), but it is crucial for uniqueness. Indeed, we claim
that infinitely many equilibria arise whenever R(1−) > R(1). To see this, fix a constant
R(1−) ≥ β > R(1) and define the new reward R̃ by R̃(1) = β and R̃(r) = R(r) for r < 1.
We assume that β is so that the constant µ̄∞ associated with R̃ still satisfies µ < µ̄∞.
As mentioned above, the reward R̃ admits an equilibrium F̃ ∗ as described Theorem 2.2,
and inspection of the formula shows that F̃ ∗ differs from the equilibrium F ∗ corresponding
to R. More generally, F̃ ∗ is different for any two choices of β. To prove the claim, we
argue that F̃ ∗ is also an equilibrium for R. If all players use the same stopping distribution,
their value functions are the same under both rewards because achieving the last rank is a
nullset for any player. However the rewards differ in the analysis of unilateral deviations:
the inequality R̃(1) > R(1) implies that if a player is not incentivized to deviate under R̃,
the same holds under R. In particular, F̃ ∗ is also an equilibrium under R, proving the claim.
Conversely, F ∗ need not be an equilibrium under R̃, as can be seen from our uniqueness
result for β = R(1−).
Remark 2.5. The framework of [37] allows for the rigorous construction of a continuum of
(a.e.) independent processes satisfying an Exact Law of Large Numbers. A short summary
of the pertinent results can be found, e.g., in [30, Section 3]. Alternately to explicitly
formulating the game with a continuum of players, one can also directly analyze the problem
of a “representative” player facing a distribution, as it is sometimes done in the literature on
mean field games—this corresponds to taking the Exact Law of Large Numbers as a given.
3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
We first show by a direct verification argument that the stated distribution is indeed an
equilibrium. The proof of uniqueness occupies the remainder of the section.
























R̄− g(0) = 1,
Lemma 2.1 yields that F ∗ ∈ F . To see that F ∗ is an equilibrium, fix some player i and
suppose that all other players stop according to F ∗. Using the property g(g−1(z)) ≤ z of
the right-continuous inverse of the left-continuous function g(y) = R(1− y), we have
ξF
∗
(x) ≤ g(F ∗(x)) ≤ [R(1) + (R̄−R(1))h(x)] ∧R(0) =: ϕ(x).
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By Itô’s formula and Jensen’s inequality, ϕ(Xt) is a bounded supermartingale. Hence,
optional sampling implies that for any finite stopping time τ ,
E[ξF
∗
(Xτ )] ≤ E[ϕ(Xτ )] ≤ ϕ(x0) = R̄.
On the other hand, player i can attain R̄ by choosing F ∗, by symmetry. This shows that
F ∗ is optimal for player i and hence that F ∗ is an equilibrium.
3.1 Relating Constant Rewards to Atoms, and Jumps in Reward to Gaps
in Support
We first relate atoms in equilibrium distributions to intervals of constancy of the reward
(and hence of g). Technical details aside, the message is that in equilibrium, equal pay must
correspond to equal performance: ranks with the same reward are occupied by players that
stop at the same level, and vice versa.
We do not yet impose the continuity properties of R, which will allow us to prove that
they are important for the existence of equilibria. Instead, R is any decreasing function in
this subsection, which of course implies that its discontinuities are of jump-type.
Lemma 3.1. Let F ∈ F be a mean field equilibrium. If F has an atom at x1 ∈ R+, then g
is constant on (F (x1−), F (x1)]. As a result, we have ξF (x) = g(F (x)) for all x ∈ R+.
Proof. Set y0 := F (x1−) and y1 := F (x1). Let ν be the measure associated with F . Consider
for each ε > 0 the perturbed measure
νε := λε(ν + (y1 − y0)(δx1+ε − δx1)) + (1− λε)δ0,










This ensures that νε ∈ F . Suppose that g is not constant on (y0, y1]; then





g(y)dy =: η > 0,


























+ λε(y1 − y0)η.




ξF dF > 0 for
ε sufficiently small, contradicting the assumption that F is an equilibrium. Finally, if g is
constant on (y0, y1], it is clear that ξ
F (x1) = g(y1) = g(F (x1)).
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As g is increasing, each level set {g = c} is an interval. If the interval has positive
length, we say that g has a flat segment at level c. In all that follows, we denote by
F−1(y) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ y} the left-continuous inverse (or quantile function) of F .
Lemma 3.2. Suppose g has a flat segment at level c, so that y1 = inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : g(y) = c}
and y2 = sup{y ∈ [0, 1] : g(y) = c} satisfy y1 < y2. Suppose F ∈ F is a mean field
equilibrium, define x+1 = F
−1(y1+) and x2 = F
−1(y2). Then we must have x
+
1 = x2.
Moreover, F (x+1 −) = y1 and F (x+1 ) = y2.
Proof. Let ν be the measure associated with F and xε1 = F
−1(y1 + ε). Suppose on the
contrary that x2 > x
ε
1 for some ε ∈ (0, y2− y1). Then y1 < F (xε1) < y2 and thus ξF (xε1) = c.
Consider the measure
ζ := ν|(xε1,x2) + (y2 − F (x2−))δx2
with total mass |ζ| = y2 − F (xε1) > 0. We distinguish two cases:
(i) Case y2 < 1. In this case, let β ∈ (y2, 1) and xβ := F−1(β) ∈ [x2,∞). For some
λ ∈ [0, 1] to be determined later, define the measure
νλ = ν − ζ + |ζ|(λδxε1 + (1− λ)δxβ ).
In words, νλ is obtained from ν by removing all mass on (x
ε
1, x2), plus possibly an additional
atom at x2 so that the total removed mass is y2 −F (xε1), and moving this mass to atoms at
xε1 and xβ according to weights λ and 1− λ. Clearly νλ is a probability measure supported






hdζ + |ζ| (λh(xε1) + (1− λ)h(xβ))
= λ
∫





[h(xε1)− h] dζ < 0 and
∫




hdν. We then have νλ ∈ F by Lemma 2.1. Using the optimality of F and that




















ν(xε1, x2) + (1− λ)(ξF (xβ)− ξF (x2))ζ{x2}.
Lemma 3.1 rules out the possibility that F (x2−) < y2 < F (x2), so we must be in one of the
following two subcases:
(i-a) F (x2−) = y2. In this case, ζ{x2} = 0 and
∫





Using |ζ| > 0 and ξF (xβ) ≥ g(β) > c and λ < 1, we obtain the contradiction that
∫
ξF d(νλ − ν) > 0.
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(i-b) F (x2−) < y2 = F (x2). In this case, Lemma 3.1 implies ξF (x2) = g(F (x2)) =
g(F (x2−)+) = c and we reach the same contradiction:
∫










(ii) Case y2 = 1. Then y1 > 0 as g is not a.e. constant. Let x1 := F
−1(y1) ≤ xε1. We
note that ν[0, x1] ≥ y1 > 0 and consider the measure
νλ = ν − λζ − (1− λ)ν|[0,x1] + {λ|ζ|+ (1− λ)ν[0, x1]} δxε1


























Similarly as in Case (i), one can show that either ζ{x2} = 0 or ξF (x2) = c, both of which
lead to










dν|[0,x1] = 0. It follows that ξF (x) = c for ν-a.e. x ∈ [0, x1]. On the
other hand, the definitions of x1 and y1 imply that F (x) < y1 and ξ
F (x) < c for all x < x1.
So it must hold that either x1 = 0 or ν[0, x1) = 0. Both cases lead to F (x1−) = 0 and
ν{x1} ≥ y1 > 0. But F (x1−) = 0 yields, by Lemma 3.1, that ξF (x1) = g(F (x1−)+) =
g(0+) < c, whereas ν{x1} > 0 implies ξF (x1) = c, a contradiction. This completes the
proof that F−1(y1+) = F
−1(y2).
Finally, let x+1 := F
−1(y1+). Clearly F (x
+
1 ) = F (F
−1(y2)) ≥ y2. For any x < x+1 and
ε > 0, we have x < xε1 and F (x) < y1+ε. Passing to the limit then yields F (x
+
1 −) ≤ y1 < y2.
As g is constant on (F (x+1 −), F (x+1 )], we must have F (x+1 −) = y1 and F (x+1 ) = y2.
Remark 3.3. If in Lemma 3.2 we also have g(y1) = c, then the proof goes through with x
ε
1
replaced by x1 = F
−1(y1) ∨ 0. (The reason for using xε1 is to have ξF (xε1) = g(F (xε1)) = c.)
As a result, we have x1 = x
+
1 = x2. In particular, if y1 = 0, then F (0) = y2.
Remark 3.4. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 imply that for the existence of a mean field equilibrium,
it is necessary that g be left-continuous at any level for which it contains a flat segment. In
particular, if the reward function R is piecewise constant, a mean field equilibrium can only
exist if R is right-continuous.
The feasibility constraint yields one equation to pin down the equilibrium. The best
way to illustrate this is to go through a particular case of Theorem 2.2 where the reward
function is of cut-off type. That is the purpose of the next proposition—here, the feasibility
constraint and the preceding results on atoms are already sufficient to uniquely identify the
equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.5. Let R(r) = 1α1[0,α)(r) for some α ∈ (0, 1). Then the unique mean field
equilibrium is given by the two-point distribution να := (1 − α)δ0 + αδx1 where x1 is the
unique point in (x0,∞) with h(x1) = 1/α.
Proof. We first derive a necessary condition for F ∈ F to be an equilibrium. Let xα =
F−1((1−α)+). By Lemma 3.2 and Remark 3.3, we have F (0) = 1−α, F (xα−) = 1−α and
F (xα) = 1. That is, the measure associated with F must take the form ν = (1−α)δ0+αδxα .




hdνα = 1, contradicting
ν ∈ F . Suppose xα < x1 (which is only feasible if µ ≤ 0), then there is β ∈ (α, 1) such that
ν ′ = (1− β)δ0 + βδxα is feasible. In view of ξF (xα) = g(F (xα)) = g(1) > g(1− α) = ξF (0),
the distribution ν ′ is strictly preferable to ν when the other players choose ν. As a result,
xα = x1, which uniquely identifies F . To check that F is indeed an equilibrium, we argue
as in the beginning of Section 3.
The above proof does not generalize to piecewise constant reward functions with multiple
jumps: while the feasibility constraint still yields one equation, there are now multiple
unknowns (the locations of the atoms). To determine mean field equilibria for general
reward functions, it is necessary to analyze the effect of jumps in some detail. Let
J(g) := {y ∈ (0, 1) : g(y−) < g(y+)}
be the set of interior jump points of g. The next lemma says that any jump of g—or
equivalently of R—induces a flat segment in any equilibrium distribution. (The reasoning in
Remark 2.4 shows that this assertion fails at y = 0, whence the definition of J(g) considers
only interior jumps.)
Lemma 3.6. Let F be a mean field equilibrium. For each y ∈ J(g), the interval {x ≥ 0 :
F (x) = y} has positive length.
Proof. Let y1 ∈ J(g), then x1 := F−1(y1) ∈ [0,∞) as y1 ∈ (0, 1). Suppose for contradiction
that {x ≥ 0 : F (x) = y1} has zero length, then F (x) > y1 for all x > x1. Let ν be
the measure associated with F . In the remainder of the proof we construct a feasible
distribution ν ′ that is strictly better than ν. By Lemma 3.1 we have either F (x1−) = y1 or
F (x1−) < y1 = F (x1).
(i) Case F (x1−) = y1. In this case, x1 > 0 and F is non-constant in any left neighborhood
of x1. Fix γ ∈ (0, g(y1+)− g(y1−)) and observe that
lim
ε→0+
ξF (x1 − 2ε) = g(y1−), lim
ε→0+
h(x1 − ε)− h(x1 − 2ε)





We can thus find ε > 0 such that
ξF (x1 − 2ε) > g(y1−)− γ/2 (3.1)
and
h(x1 − ε)− h(x1 − 2ε)
h(x1)− h(x1 − 2ε)
>
γ
g(y1+)− g(y1−) + γ
.
The measure ζ := ν|(x1−ε,x1) has mass |ζ| > 0. Consider the probability measure
ν ′ := ν − ζ + |ζ| (λδx2 + (1− λ)δx1−2ε)
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where x2 ∈ (x1,∞) is chosen to satisfy
h(x1 − ε)− h(x1 − 2ε)
h(x2)− h(x1 − 2ε)
>
γ/2







hdζ − h(x1 − 2ε)
h(x2)− h(x1 − 2ε)
∈
(
h1(x1 − ε)− h(x1 − 2ε)




It is easy to check that
∫
hd(ν ′ − ν) = 0, hence ν ′ ∈ F by Lemma 2.1. To see that ν ′ is
strictly better than ν, we use (3.1)–(3.3) and F (x2) > y1:
∫
ξFd(ν ′ − ν) = λ
∫
(ξF (x2)− ξF )dζ + (1− λ)
∫
(ξF (x1 − 2ε)− ξF )dζ
≥ λ(g(y1+)− g(y1−))|ζ|+ (1− λ)(ξF (x1 − 2ε)− g(y1−))|ζ|
> |ζ|
(











(ii) Case F (x1−) < y1 = F (x1). In this case, {x ≥ 0 : F (x) = y1} having zero length
implies that F is non-constant in any right neighborhood of x1. Moreover, Lemma 3.1
implies that g(y1−) = g(y1). Fix γ ∈ (0, (y1 − F (x1−))(g(y1+) − g(y1))) and ε > 0 such
that ξF (x1 + ε) < g(y1+) + γ. We define ζ := ν|[x1,x1+ε) and
ν ′ := ν − ζ + |ζ|δx2 ,
where x2 > x1 is to be determined. Since h is strictly increasing and ν(x1, x1 + ε) > 0, we
see that |ζ|h(x1) <
∫
hdζ < |ζ|h(x1+ ε) and consequently there exists x2 ∈ (x1, x1+ ε) such
that
∫
hd(ν ′ − ν) = |ζ|h(x2)−
∫
hdζ = 0.
For this choice of x2, we have ν
′ ∈ F by Lemma 2.1. Moreover, ν ′ is strictly better than ν:
∫
ξF d(ν ′ − ν) = (y1 − F (x1−))[ξF (x2)− ξF (x1)] +
∫
(ξF (x2)− ξF )dν|(x1,x1+ε)
≥ (y1 − F (x1−))(g(y1+)− g(y1)) + (g(y1+)− ξF (x1 + ε))ν(x1, x1 + ε)
≥ (y1 − F (x1−))(g(y1+)− g(y1))− γ > 0
by the choice of γ.
3.2 Characterizing the Equilibrium
From now on, we shall work under the assumption that µ < µ̄∞ and R is right-continuous
with R(0) > R(1−) = R(1).
The general idea of the uniqueness argument is to analyze a minimization problem: in
equilibrium, the opposing players act such as to minimize the value function of a given
representative player, subject to the constraint that the opponents act symmetrically. This
turns out to be substantially more involved than in the n-player case, due to the possible
presence of atoms in the equilibrium distribution and the non-invertibility of the function g.
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Let uF be the value function of a representative player if the other players use F ∈ F .
Dynamic programming and optimal stopping theory yield
uF (x0) = sup
τ<∞
E[ξF (Xτ )] = (ξ
F ◦ h−1)conc(1) ≤ (g ◦ F ◦ h−1)conc(1)
where h is the scale function (2.2) with normalization h(x0) = 1 and conc denotes the
concave envelope on R+. The last inequality is due to possible breaking of ties, cf. (2.1).
Lemma 3.1 shows that the inequality must be an equality if F is a mean field equilibrium,






Indeed, given arbitrary F ∈ F , a representative player can achieve R̄ by also choosing F ,
and in equilibrium, this is the best possible performance, by symmetry. Combining the two
arguments, any mean field equilibrium F ∗ must satisfy
(g ◦ F ∗ ◦ h−1)conc(1) = uF ∗(x0) = min
F∈F
uF (x0) ≤ min
F∈F
(g ◦ F ◦ h−1)conc(1).
That is,
F ∗ ∈ argmin
F∈F
Φ(F )conc(1), where Φ(F ) := g ◦ F ◦ h−1.
We also write Φ−1(φ) := g−1 ◦ φ ◦ h. We recall that g−1 denotes the right-continuous
inverse of g; in particular, g−1(g(y)) ≥ y and g(g−1(z)) ≤ z. Similarly, Φ−1(Φ(F )) ≥ F and
Φ(Φ−1(φ)) ≤ φ. Finally, we denote
w̄F := inf{w ∈ [0, h(∞)] : Φ(F )(w) = g(1)} ≤ h(∞),
ȳ := inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : g(y) = g(1)},
F ′ := {F ∈ F : w̄F > 1, and w̄F < h(∞) in case ȳ < 1}.
Lemma 3.7. If F is a mean field equilibrium, then F ∈ F ′ and w̄F = inf{w ∈ [0, h(∞)] :
F ◦ h−1(w) = 1}. In particular, F ◦ h−1(w̄F ) = 1.
Proof. We first show F ∈ F ′. Suppose w̄F ≤ 1. Then
Φ(F )conc(1) ≥ Φ(F )conc(w̄F ) = Φ(F )conc(w̄F+) = g(1).
Consider the distribution G(x) = λ1[0,x0+ε)(x) + 1[x0+ε,∞)(x) where ε > 0 and λ ∈ (0, ȳ)
are chosen so that
∫
hdG = (1 − λ)h(x0 + ε) = 1. We have Φ(G) = g(λ)1[0,h(x0+ε)) +
g(1)1[h(x0+ε),∞). The concave hull of this function is readily determined and in view of
g(λ) < g(1), we arrive at Φ(G)conc(1) < g(1) ≤ Φ(F )conc(1), contradicting the optimality of
F .
Suppose ȳ < 1 and w̄F = h(∞). Then for all x <∞, we have h(x) < h(∞) = w̄F , which
implies g(1) > Φ(F )(h(x)) = g(F (x)). But then F (x) ≤ ȳ < 1 for all x ∈ R, contradicting
that F is the cdf of a probability measure on R.
We next show F ◦ h−1(w̄F ) = 1. This is trivial if w̄F = h(∞), so we may assume that
w̄F < h(∞). For any w > w̄F , we have g(F ◦ h−1(w)) = Φ(F )(w) = g(1), which implies:
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(i) F ◦ h−1(w) = 1 if ȳ = 1. Then by right-continuity, F ◦ h−1(w̄F ) = 1.
(ii) F ◦ h−1(w) > ȳ if ȳ < 1 and g(ȳ) < g(1). In this case, h−1(w) ≥ F−1(ȳ+) for all
w > w̄F , which further yields h
−1(w̄F ) ≥ F−1(ȳ+). By Lemma 3.2, F jumps from ȳ to 1 at
F−1(ȳ+). It follows that F ◦ h−1(w̄F ) ≥ F (F−1(ȳ+)) = 1.
(iii) F ◦ h−1(w) ≥ ȳ if ȳ < 1 and g(ȳ) = g(1). In this case, we use Remark 3.3 to
obtain h−1(w) ≥ F−1(ȳ) = F−1(ȳ+) and thus h−1(w̄F ) ≥ F−1(ȳ+). We obtain the same
conclusion as in (ii).
Finally, for w < w̄F , Φ(F )(w) < g(1) implies F ◦ h−1(w) < 1.
Lemma 3.8. Let F ∈ F ′. Suppose there exists an increasing concave function φ ≥ Φ(F )
on [0, h(∞)] satisfying φ(1) ≤ Φ(F )conc(1) and
∫ h(∞)
0
(1− g−1 ◦ φ(w))dw < 1.
Then there exists F ′ ∈ F such that Φ(F ′)conc(1) < Φ(F )conc(1) and consequently, F cannot
be a mean field equilibrium.
Proof. Let φ be as stated. Note that w̄F > 1 implies Φ(F )(1+) < g(1) which further yields
Φ(F )conc(1) < g(1) = Φ(F )(w̄F+) ≤ φ(w̄F+) = φ(w̄F ). Let w̄φ := inf{w ≥ 0 : φ(w) =
g(1)}. Since φ(1) < g(1) and φ(w̄F+) = g(1), we know 1 < w̄φ ≤ w̄F . Consider four cases:
(i) µ ≤ 0 and ȳ = 1. In this case, h(∞) = ∞ and g−1 is continuous at g(1). Choose
ε ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(ε) < φ(1). Such ε exists: as φ is increasing and concave, it must
be strictly increasing before reaching g(1). Let φε(w) := φ(εw). Then φε is concave on
R+ and satisfies φε(1) < φ(1). Next, define Fλ := Φ
−1(λφ + (1 − λ)φε). One can check
that Fλ is right-continuous and satisfies Fλ(∞) = 1. We also have that for λ ∈ [0, 1),
Φ(Fλ)
conc(1) ≤ (λφ+ (1− λ)φε)conc (1) = λφ(1) + (1 − λ)φε(1) < φ(1) ≤ Φ(F )conc(1),
showing that Fλ is strictly better than F . To reach the desired contradiction, it remains to





(1− Fλ ◦ h−1)(w)dw =
∫ ∞
0
(1− g−1 ◦ (λφ+ (1− λ)φε))(w)dw.
As g−1 is monotone, it has at most countably many points of discontinuity, and ȳ = 1 implies
that g(1) is not one of them. For any z < g(1), the set {w ≥ 0 : φ(w) = z} has zero Lebesgue
measure because φ is strictly increasing before reaching g(1). It follows that as λ → 1, the
integrand converges a.e. to 1−g−1 ◦φ. Using 0 ≤ 1−g−1 ◦ (λφ+(1−λ)φε) ≤ 1−g−1 ◦φε ≤
1 − g−1 ◦ Φ(F )(ε · id) ≤ 1 − F ◦ h−1(ε · id) and
∫∞
0 (1 − F ◦ h−1(εw))dw = 1ε
∫
hdF < ∞,







(1− g−1 ◦ φ)(w)dw < 1.
By Lemma 2.1, this shows that Fλ is feasible for λ sufficiently close to one.
(ii) µ ≤ 0 and ȳ < 1. In this case, 1 < w̄φ ≤ w̄F < h(∞) = ∞. Choose ε > 0 such that
w̄φ+ε < h(∞) and
∫ w̄φ
0 (1−g−1 ◦φ)(w)dw+(1− ȳ)ε < 1. Let φ′ε denote the line connecting










Then φ′ε is concave on R+ and satisfies φ
′
ε(1) < φ(1). As in the previous case, we define
F ′λ := Φ
−1(λφ+(1−λ)φ′ε). Then F ′λ is a cdf supported on R+ which satisfies Φ(F ′λ)conc(1) <









(1− g−1(λg(1) + (1− λ)φε(w)))dw.





0 (1− g−1 ◦ φ)(w)dw + (1− ȳ)ε < 1.
(iii) 0 < µ < µ̄∞ and ȳ = 1. In this case, w̄φ ≤ h(∞) < ∞ and g−1 is continuous at


































Since φ(0) ≥ g(0) = ℓ(0) and φ(h(∞)) = g(1) = ℓ(h(∞)), by concavity, either φ > ℓ on
(0, h(∞)) or φ = ℓ. The latter case is impossible as F ≤ Φ−1(Φ(F )) ≤ Φ−1(φ) = Φ−1(ℓ)
would imply F /∈ F . Set F ′′λ := Φ−1(λφ + (1 − λ)ℓ). We again have Φ(F ′′λ )conc(1) ≤






(1− g−1(λφ(w) + (1− λ)ℓ(w)))dw.
Using the continuity of g−1 at g(1), the strict monotonicity of λφ+ (1−λ)ℓ before reaching
g(1), and bounded convergence theorem, we deduce that I(·) is continuous on (0, 1) satisfying
I(1−) =
∫ h(∞)




(1− g−1 ◦ ℓ)(w)dw =
∫ h(∞)
0
(1− Φ−1(ℓ) ◦ h−1)(w)dw =
∫
hdΦ−1(ℓ) > 1.
We may thus choose λ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that I(λ0) = 1. Then F ′′λ0 ∈ F and the contradiction
is complete.
(iv) 0 < µ < µ̄∞ and ȳ < 1. In this case, w̄φ < h(∞) <∞. Let φ′ε and F ′λ be constructed
as in Case (ii) with ε satisfying w̄φ + 2ε < h(∞). Define
G(x) :=
{
γF ′λ(x), x < h
−1(w̄φ + 2ε),
1, x ≥ h−1(w̄φ + 2ε),
for some γ ∈ (0, 1) to be determined. We have F ′λ(h−1(w̄φ + 2ε)−) ≥ F ′λ(h−1(w̄φ + ε)) =








hdF ′λ < 1 and w̄φ + 2ε > 1, we can find γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∫
hdG = 1, and
then G is feasible. We arrive that the desired contradiction after noting that Φ(G)conc(1) ≤
Φ(F ′λ)
conc(1) < Φ(F )conc(1).




Ay, where Ay = {w ∈ [0, h(∞)] ∩ R : F ◦ h−1(w) = y},
as well as wy = inf Ay. Then wy < w̄F for all y ∈ J(g). Moreover, there exists a strictly
increasing affine function ℓ1 ≥ Φ(F ) satisfying ℓ1(1) = Φ(F )conc(1) and
(i) ℓ1(w̄F ) = g(1),
(ii) Φ(F ) = ℓ1 ∧ g(1) on A,
(iii) Φ(F )(wy) = ℓ1(wy) for all y ∈ J(g).
Proof. Let F be an equilibrium, then F ∈ F ′ by Lemma 3.7. Define φ := Φ(F )conc and
ψ := ℓ1∧g(1), where ℓ1 is an affine function passing through (1, φ(1)) whose slope lies in the
super-differential of φ at w = 1. We have ℓ1 ≥ ψ ≥ φ ≥ Φ(F ), g−1◦ψ ≥ g−1◦Φ(F ) ≥ F ◦h−1
and ψ(1) ≤ ℓ1(1) = φ(1) = Φ(F )conc(1). By Lemma 3.7, Φ(F )(1+) < g(1) = Φ(F )(w̄F+) ≤
φ(w̄F ) ≤ g(1), which implies that φ(1) < g(1) = φ(w̄F ). As φ is increasing and concave, it
must be strictly increasing before reaching level g(1). Consequently, ℓ1 has positive slope.
For any y ∈ J(g), Ay has positive length by Lemma 3.6. Since F ◦ h−1 = y < 1 on Ay, we
must have Ay ⊆ [0, w̄F ) and wy < w̄F . It remains to show properties (i)–(iii). Specifically, we
show below that if one of these properties does not hold, then
∫ h(∞)
0 (1− g−1 ◦ψ(w))dw < 1.
Applying Lemma 3.8 with ψ being the increasing concave function, this contradicts that F
is an equilibrium.
(i) Let w̄1 := ℓ
−1
1 (g(1)). Since ℓ1 ≥ Φ(F ), we necessarily have w̄1 ≤ w̄F . Suppose




(1− g−1 ◦ ψ(w))dw =
∫ w̄1
0




(1− F ◦ h−1(w))dw <
∫ h(∞)
0
(1− F ◦ h−1(w))dw =
∫
hdF ≤ 1.
(ii) Suppose Φ(F )(w0) < ψ(w0) for some w0 ∈ A. As F ◦ h−1(w0) /∈ J(g), we have
F ◦ h−1(w0) ≤ g−1(Φ(F )(w0)) < g−1(ψ(w0)). By the right-continuity of F ◦ h−1 and
g−1 ◦ ψ, it follows that F ◦ h−1 < g−1 ◦ ψ in a right neighborhood of w0. Thus
∫ h(∞)
0
(1− g−1 ◦ ψ(w))dw <
∫ h(∞)
0
(1− F ◦ h−1(w))dw =
∫
hdF ≤ 1.
(iii) Let y ∈ J(g). Suppose Φ(F )(wy) < ℓ1(wy). Let w′y := ℓ−11 (Φ(F )(wy)). We have
w′y < ℓ
−1
1 (ℓ1(wy)) = wy < w̄F and ℓ1(w
′
y) = Φ(F )(wy) = g(y) < g(y+) ≤ g(1). Define
F1(x) :=
{
F (x), if x < h−1(w′y) or x ≥ h−1(wy),
F (h−1(wy)) = y, if h
−1(w′y) ≤ x < h−1(wy).
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Clearly, F1 ≥ F . For x ∈ [h−1(w′y), h−1(wy)), we have h(x) ∈ [w′y, wy) and F (x) = F ◦




hdF ≤ 1. Now,
observe that
ψ(w) ≥ Φ(F1)(w) =
{
Φ(F )(w), if w < w′y or w ≥ wy,















Remark 3.10. When g is continuous, A = [0, h(∞)] ∩R, and Lemma 3.9 states that Φ(F )
is affine before reaching level g(1).
We can now complete the uniqueness argument.
Proof of Theorem 2.2—Uniqueness. Let F be any equilibrium. By Lemma 3.1, Φ(F )(0) =
g(F (0)) = g(0+) = g(0). Let ℓ1 be the strictly increasing affine function given by Lemma 3.9.
In particular, we have ℓ1(1) = Φ(F )
conc(1) and ℓ1(w̄F ) = g(1), and Φ(F )(w) = ℓ1(w) ∧ g(1)
whenever F ◦ h−1(w) /∈ J(g) or w = wy = inf{w ∈ [0, h(∞)] ∩ R : F ◦ h−1(w) = y} < w̄F
for some y ∈ J(g).
We first find a formula for ℓ1. Observe that either F ◦ h−1(0) = F (0) /∈ J(g) or F (0) ∈
J(g) and wF (0) = 0. In both cases, ℓ1(0) = Φ(F )(0) = g(0) < g(1). We also have ℓ1(1) =
Φ(F )conc(1) = uF (x0) = R̄ by symmetry. This completely determines the shape of ℓ1;
namely,
ℓ1(w) = g(0) + (R̄− g(0))w.
Next, recall A,Ay, wy as defined in Lemma 3.9. We decompose [0, h(∞)] ∩ R into three
disjoint parts: A1, A\A1 and
⋃
y∈J(g) Ay. Note that A1 = [w̄F , h(∞)]∩R = [ℓ−11 (g(1)), h(∞)]∩
R by Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 3.9 (i), and that each Ay with y ∈ J(g) has positive length by
Lemma 3.6.
(i) On A1, we have F ◦ h−1 ≡ 1.
(ii) On A\A1, we have g(F ◦ h−1) = Φ(F ) = ℓ1 ∧ g(1) = ℓ1 by Lemma 3.9 (ii). The
strict monotonicity of ℓ1 implies that F ◦ h−1 is strictly increasing on A\A1. Thus, Ay is
a singleton for all y /∈ J(g) ∪ {1}. The relation g(F ◦ h−1) = ℓ1 also implies F ◦ h−1 ≤
g−1 ◦ g(F ◦ h−1) = g−1(ℓ1). In view of Lemma 3.2, the inequality is in fact an equality.
Indeed, any flat segment of g induces a gap in the range of F , which precisely excludes
those points y for which g−1(g(y)) 6= y, except possibly at the left end point of the flat
segment, say y1. The exception only happens if F contains a flat segment at height y1 which
is equivalent to Ay1 having positive length. Thus, F ◦ h−1 = y1 is also ruled out on A\A1.
(iii) On each Ay with y ∈ J(g), we use Lemma 3.9 (iii) to obtain g(y) = Φ(F )(wy) =
ℓ1(wy), which uniquely determines wy.
In summary, we can decompose [0, h(∞)]∩R into (a) countably many intervals on which
F ◦ h−1 is flat at some level y ∈ J(g) ∪ {1} and (b) the complementary set A\A1 on which
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F ◦ h−1 = g−1(ℓ1). Each flat segment at level y ∈ J(g) has left endpoint wy = ℓ−11 (g(y)).
To uniquely determine the right-continuous function F ◦ h−1, it only remains to specify, for
each y ∈ J(g), the right endpoint
w̃y := sup{w ∈ [0, h(∞)] ∩ R : F ◦ h−1(w) = y} ≤ w̄F
of the flat segment. To this end, let y ∈ J(g) and y′ := sup{z ∈ [0, 1] : g(z) = g(y+)}. We
distinguish two cases:
• If y′ = y, then g is non-constant in any right-neighborhood of y, which implies that
F ◦ h−1(w̃y) = y. (If F ◦ h−1(w̃y) > y, then F would have an atom at h−1(w̃y) and
by Lemma 3.1, g(F ◦ h−1(w̃y)) = g(y+), contradicting the assumption that y′ = y.)
Let w(m) > w̃y be a sequence such that w
(m) → w̃y and let ym := F ◦ h−1(w(m)). By
right-continuity and the definition of w̃y, we have ym → y and ym > y. For large m,
we may assume ym < 1. Observe that w
(m) ≥ wym > w̃y, which implies wym → w̃y.
If ym /∈ J(g), then w(m) = wym ∈ A\A1 and g(ym) = ℓ1(w(m)) = ℓ1(wym) by (ii)
above. If ym ∈ J(g), then g(ym) = ℓ1(wyn) by (iii) above. Combining the two cases
and passing to the limit, we obtain g(y+) = ℓ1(w̃y).
• If y′ > y, then by Lemma 3.2, F jumps from y to y′ at F−1(y+) = h−1(w̃y). Hence,
F ◦ h−1(w̃y) = y′ and Φ(F )(w̃y) = g(y′) = g(y+). We have either y′ /∈ J(g) or
y′ ∈ J(g) with w̃y = wy′ , and both lead to ℓ1(w̃y) = Φ(F )(w̃y) = g(y+).
In both cases, we have ℓ1(w̃y) = g(y+), which uniquely determines w̃y.
Putting everything together and taking into account the right-continuity of F ◦ h−1,






y, if y ∈ J(g) and w ∈ [ℓ−11 (g(y)), ℓ−11 (g(y+))),
1, if w ≥ ℓ−11 (g(1)),
g−1(ℓ1(w)), otherwise.
In summary, F ◦ h−1(w) = g−1(ℓ1(w)∧ g(1)), or F (x) = F ∗(x) after substituting w = h(x).
This completes the proof of uniqueness.
4 Optimal Reward Design
Consider a principal who may choose a normalized reward R (i.e., satisfying R(0) = 0 and
R̄ = 1) and whose goal is to maximize the performance of the top α ∈ (0, 1) fraction of
players. More precisely, the aim is to maximize the lowest stopping position of all players
in the ranks [0, α),
xα := F
−1((1 − α)+) = F−1+ (1− α),
where F is the equilibrium resulting from R and F−1+ is the right-continuous inverse of F .
See Remark 4.2 below for the technical importance of using F−1+ , or equivalently, of using
the open interval [0, α) when defining the top ranks. Note that the constant µ̄∞ = µ̄∞(R)
in Theorem 2.2 depends on R. For the following result, we assume µ ≤ 0 to ensure that
µ < µ̄∞(R) holds for any reward R. Alternately, one may relax this condition to µ <
σ2
2x0
log( 11−α ) and restrict the principal to rewards R satisfying µ < µ̄∞(R).
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is the unique normalized reward maximizing the performance xα. The corresponding value
is x∗α = h
−1 (1/α) and the equilibrium distribution is
F ∗ = (1− α)1[0,x∗α) + 1[x∗α,∞).
Proof. Let R be an arbitrary normalized reward and g(y) = R(1− y). By Theorem 2.2, the
corresponding mean field equilibrium F is unique and
F (x) = g−1 (h(x) ∧ g(1)) = 1 ∧ inf{y : g(y) > h(x) ∧ g(1)}.
We have F (x) > 1−α if and only if g(1−α+ ε) ≤ h(x)∧ g(1) for some ε = ε(x) > 0, hence
F−1+ (1− α) = inf{x ≥ 0 : g(1− α+ ε) ≤ h(x) ∧ g(1) for some ε > 0}
= h−1(g((1 − α)+)).
As h−1 is strictly increasing, maximizing this quantity is equivalent to maximizing g((1 −
α)+). Recalling that g is monotone, left-continuous and
∫ 1
0 g(y)dy = 1, the unique maxi-
mizer is given by g∗(y) := R∗(1 − y) and the corresponding maximum value is h−1 (1/α).
By Theorem 2.2 (or Proposition 3.5), the corresponding equilibrium is F ∗.
Comparing with the results cited in the Introduction (and recalled in more detail in
Section 5.3 below), Theorem 4.1 gives a clear-cut answer to a question which remained
partially open in the n-player setting. On the other hand, the result illustrates that the
mean field analysis alone could easily lead to an oversimplified picture: the optimal design
in the n-player game is not given by the cut-off reward at the target rank, in most cases.
See also Section 5 for further comparison of mean field and n-player games.
Remark 4.2. The principal’s goal is to maximize F−1+ (1 − α) rather than the quantile
F−1(1−α). Indeed, the worst performance among the top α-fraction of players need not be
the same as the best performance among the bottom (1− α)-fraction. The equilibrium F ∗
of Theorem 4.1 has an atom of size α at x∗α and an atom of size 1− α at the origin. Thus,
(F ∗)−1+ (1− α) = x∗α but (F ∗)−1(1− α) = 0.
It is crucial to formulate the principal’s problem in the form stated above: if instead we
aim to maximize the best performance in the quantile F−1(1 − α), the optimization fails
to admit a solution. To see this, note that for each m ≥ 1, the cutoff reward R(m)(r) :=
1
α+1/m1[0,α+1/m)(r) gives rise to the equilibrium F
(m) = (1−α−1/m)1[0,xm)+1[xm,∞) where
xm = h
−1(1/(α+1/m)). Moreover, (F (m))−1(1−α) = xm increases to h−1(1/α) as m→ ∞.
However, there exists no equilibrium distribution F achieving F−1(1 − α) = h−1(1/α).
Indeed, by Theorem 4.1, such F would have to coincide with F ∗, but (F ∗)−1(1− α) = 0 <
h−1(1/α).
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Remark 4.3. In analogy to the “price of anarchy” we can compare the principal’s opti-
mization over equilibria with a different problem where the planner can dictate the players’




Using Lemma 2.1 we can check that the unique solution is F = F ∗, the equilibrium dis-
tribution of Theorem 4.1. In particular, the “welfare” of the second-best principal who can
only choose the reward function is equal to that of a planner who can dictate strategies.
This consideration also shows a different avenue to Theorem 4.1: if one is only interested
in this specific question rather than mean field equilibria for general reward functions, one
can first argue that argmaxF∈F F
−1
+ (1 − α) = F ∗ and then, as in Proposition 3.5, that F ∗
is the unique equilibrium for R∗.
5 Convergence to the Mean Field
To formulate the n-player game associated with our mean field contest, fix a decreasing,
non-constant reward vector (R1, . . . , Rn). Here R1 is interpreted as the reward for the best
rank whereas Rn is the worst. As in the mean field game, the players are ranked according to
their level of stopping and ties are split uniformly at random. The set F of feasible stopping
distributions remains the same and the definition of equilibrium is analogous. It is shown
in [32] that the n-player game admits a unique equilibrium F ∗n ∈ F as soon as the drift µ
satisfies















The equilibrium distribution has compact support [0, x̄n] and cdf





























is the equilibrium value function. In contrast to the mean field setting, F ∗n is always atomless.
Moreover, gn is strictly increasing and smooth, hence so is its (true) inverse g
−1
n .
5.1 Convergence of the n-Player Equilibrium
The next result shows that if the reward vector is induced by a reward function for the mean
field game, the n-player equilibrium distributions and value functions converge to their mean
field counterparts as described in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 5.1. Let R : [0, 1] → R+ be a reward function, µ < µ̄∞, and define Rk := R(k/n)
for k = 1, . . . , n. Then as n→ ∞, using (R1, . . . , Rn) as reward for the n-player game and R
for the mean field game, the associated unique equilibrium distributions converge weakly and
the equilibrium value functions converge uniformly on compact sets.
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Remark 5.2. If we consider a generalized reward function R with R(1−) < R(1) as
discussed in Remark 2.4, the limit of the n-player equilibria selects a particular equilib-
rium among the infinitely many mean field equilibria; namely, the one detailed in Theo-
rem 2.2. This follows from the fact that the proof of Theorem 5.1 does not use the condition
R(1−) = R(1).
Before proceeding with the proof, we state a formula that will be used in later arguments
as well. Consider the empirical cdf of i.i.d. uniform random variables {Ui}i=1,...,n−1 on [0, 1],
F̂n−1(y) =
1
n− 1#{i : Ui ≤ y}.
Let 0 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ 1. Among the n − 1 random variables {Ui}, there are In−1 = (n −
1)(1 − F̂n−1(y2)) with values above y2, Jn−1 = (n − 1)F̂n−1(y1) below y1, and Kn−1 =
(n−1)(F̂n−1(y2)− F̂n−1(y1)) in-between y1 and y2. Thus, we have the following formula for























Proof of Theorem 5.1. We have Rn = R(1) and R1 = R(1/n) → R(0) by the right-




0 R(r)dr = R̄. It follows
that µ̄n → µ̄∞, so that µ < µ̄∞ ensures µ < µ̄n for all n sufficiently large and the equilibria
are uniquely defined. The pointwise convergence of u∗n to u
∗ is clear from their respective
formulas. As these functions are increasing and u∗ is continuous, the pointwise convergence
is locally uniform (see e.g. [34, Proposition 2.1]).
To show the weak convergence of the equilibrium distributions, we prove F ∗n(x) → F ∗(x)
whenever x is a point of continuity of F ∗. We first argue that
gn → g at at every point of continuity of g. (5.2)

















By the strong law of large numbers, F̂n−1(y) → y a.s. for each y. If y is a point of continuity





→ g(y) a.s. and the bounded convergence theorem yields
gn(y) → g(y) as claimed.
We have F ∗n(x) = g
−1
n (zn) for zn := u
∗
n(x) and similarly F
∗(x) = g−1(z) for z := u∗(x).
By the above, zn → z for all x, and therefore we need to show that g−1n (zn) → g−1(z)
whenever z ∈ C, where C is the set of continuity points of g−1. Up to normalization, we may
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think of gn, g as cdf of weakly converging distributions. It is then known that the inverses
g−1n converge to g
−1 on the set where the left- and right-continuous inverses of g coincide, and
hence on C (cf. the proof of [15, Theorem 3.2.2, p. 100]). We have g−1n (z ± ε) → g−1(z ± ε)
for z ∈ C and ε > 0 with z ± ε ∈ C. Using that g−1n , g−1 are monotone, we deduce that
g−1n (zn) → g−1(z) whenever zn → z and z ∈ C, as desired.
Remark 5.3. A discussion related to Theorem 5.1 can be found in the work [17] on n-player
capacity-constrained contests, which can be related to the present game via Skorokhod
embedding. (Some results of the preprint [17] were later published as [18].) Namely, [17,
Proposition 9] studies the effect of scaling the n-player contest by multiplying the number
of participants while dividing the reward at each rank. This basically corresponds to taking
limn F
∗
n , if only for the particular case where R is a step function. An infinite player game
is not considered, so that the limiting distribution F ∗ cannot be recognized as a mean field
object. Instead, the authors derive an involved algorithm [17, Remark A-1] to construct F ∗ =
limn F
∗
n . The limit is a step function in this particular case, and the algorithm determines
the n− 1 jump locations and magnitudes. It seems that the simple representation (2.3), or
the game-theoretic meaning of F ∗, were not identified.
5.2 ε-Nash Equilibrium Property of the Mean Field Strategy
Recall that ξF (x) denotes the payoff for stopping at x if all other players in the mean field
game use F ; cf. (2.1). Analogously, we can define the expected payoff ξFn (x) in the n-player









n dF − ε for all F ∈ F .
That is, a player deviating unilaterally from F ∗ can improve her expected payoff by at
most ε. Correspondingly, F ∗ is an o(1)-Nash equilibrium as n → ∞ if for any ε > 0, the

















We can now state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5.4. Let R be a reward function, µ < µ̄∞, and let F
∗ be the associated mean field
equilibrium. Define Rk := R(k/n), k = 1, . . . , n as reward for the n-player game. Then F
∗
is an o(1)-Nash equilibrium of the n-player game as n→ ∞ if and only if R is continuous.
The positive result in Theorem 5.4 is consistent with a large body of literature; cf. the
Introduction. That the continuity condition is sharp, may be surprising. Indeed we will
show that if R has a jump and ε > 0 is small enough, then F ∗ is not an ε-Nash equilibrium,
for all large n. This is not related to atoms in the equilibrium but rather to the gap in
the support of F ∗ caused by the jump R(x)−R(x−) in reward and a stochastic knife-edge
phenomenon. The idea of the proof is that a player can improve by suitably shifting some
mass of the stopping distribution into the gap. A level of stopping inside the gap would
imply the reward R(x) in the mean field game, but in the n-player game, the result depends
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on the sample—the reward is approximately R(x) in roughly half the samples, but the higher
reward R(x−) in the other half. By shifting more mass from below the gap than from above
(all while maintaining feasibility), the player can increase the payoff relative to F ∗.
The proof of Theorem 5.4 occupies the remainder of this subsection. Throughout the
proof, the rewards and F ∗ are defined as in Theorem 5.4. As a first step, we derive a
convenient formula for ξFn (x). The probability that among players 2, . . . , n, there are exactly





(1− F (x))iF (x−)j(F (x)− F (x−))k.
Such a configuration leads to an average payoff (Ri+1 + · · · + Ri+k+1)/(k + 1) for player 1











(1− F (x))iF (x−)j(F (x)− F (x−))k.
This reduces to gn(F (x)) if F (x) = F (x−). Taking φ(i, j, k) = (Ri+1+ · · ·+Ri+k+1)/(k+1)
in (5.1), we have the alternative representation












Lemma 5.5. Let F ∈ F have an atom at x. Then limn ξFn (x) = ξF (x).
Proof. Let F have an atom at x. Write y1 = F (x−) and y2 = F (x). By (5.4),






































g(y)dy = ξF (x).
Lemma 5.6. Let R be continuous. Then ξF
∗
n (·) converges to ξF
∗
(·) uniformly.
Proof. We first show that ξF
∗
n converges to ξ
F ∗ pointwise. The convergence at points of
discontinuity of F ∗ holds by Lemma 5.5. At points of continuity, we have ξF
∗
n = gn ◦F ∗ and
ξF
∗
= g◦F ∗. The pointwise convergence then follows from (5.2) and the assumed continuity
of g.
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By Theorem 2.2, F ∗ has compact support [0, x̄]. For x > x̄ it is clear that |ξF ∗n (x) −
ξF
∗
(x)| = |gn(1) − g(1)| = |R(1/n) − R(0)| → 0. To see that the convergence is also
uniform on [0, x̄], we note that ξF
∗
n is an increasing function for each n. Moreover, the
pointwise limit ξF
∗
is continuous: as g is continuous, we have g(g−1(z)) = z and then
ξF
∗
(x) = g(F ∗(x)) = [R(1)+(R̄−R(1))h(x)]∧R(0) is continuous as well; cf. Lemma 3.1 and
Theorem 2.2. A standard argument for monotone functions then yields that the pointwise
convergence is uniform.
Lemma 5.7. If g has a jump at y ∈ (0, 1), then lim infn gn(y) ≥ [g(y) + g(y+)]/2.4

























































y(1− y) converges to N (0, 1) in






































where N(·) is the standard normal cdf. Combining the two limits, we obtain
lim inf
n
gn(y) ≥ g(y′) + (g(y+) − g(y′))(1 −N(γ)) = g(y′)N(γ) + g(y+)(1 −N(γ)).
In view of the left-continuity of g, sending γ → 0 and y′ → y concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Part 1: Sufficiency. Let R be continuous and ε > 0. Lemma 5.6
shows the existence of nε such that ‖ξF ∗n − ξF
∗‖∞ < ε/2 whenever n ≥ nε. Let F ∈ F . For
4The reverse inequality lim supn gn(y) ≤ [g(y) + g(y+)]/2 also holds, but is not needed for our purposes.
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∣ dF ∗ < ε.
This proves the o(1)-Nash property of F ∗.





























By Theorem 2.2, the associated mean field equilibrium F ∗ is flat on [a, b) and F ∗(a− η) <
F ∗(a) = y0 < F
∗(b+ η) for any η > 0. Suppose players 2, . . . , n all use F ∗ with associated
measure ν∗ and player 1 considers an alternative strategy of the form
ν = ν∗ − ζ + |ζ|δa′
for some a′ ∈ (a, b) and a subprobability ζ ≤ ν∗ with density dζ/dν∗ = f . To ensure the









fdν∗ = 0. (5.6)
































Let x ≥ 0. If F ∗ is continuous at x, we use (5.2) to get lim supn ξF
∗
n (x) = lim supn gn(F
∗(x)) ≤
g(F ∗(x)+), whereas if F ∗ has a jump at x, we use Lemma 5.5 to get ξF
∗
n (x) → ξF
∗
(x) =









g(F ∗(·)+)fdν∗|R+\{a} + g(F ∗(a))f(a)ν∗{a}. (5.9)
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As F ∗(x) < y0 for x < a and thus g(F
∗(x)+) ≤ g(y0) = a, we can further bound the above












It remains to show that by choosing a suitable Radon–Nikodym derivative f , the lower
bound Cf for the expected improvement can be made strictly positive. To this end, we pick
f(x) = 1(a−η,a](x) + λ1[b,∞)(x)
for some constants λ ∈ [0, 1] and η > 0 to be determined. With this form of f , we always



















ν∗(a− η, a]− λ
(










R(0)− g(y0) + g(y0+)
2
)




where the inequality is derived by replacing λ by its upper bound. Choose a′ − a and η
sufficiently small so that
h(a′)− h((a− η) ∨ 0)






Then λ ∈ (0, 1) and Cf > 0. This concludes the proof of (5.5) and hence of the theorem.
5.3 Convergence of the Optimal Reward Design
We have seen in Theorem 4.1 that the optimal design to maximize performance at a given
target rank α is the cut-off reward at that same rank. As mentioned in the Introduction,
the best design in the prelimit is more complicated: for the n-player game with zero drift,
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Figure 1: (a) Convergence of the optimal cut-off ratio k∗n/n to α. (b) Log-log plot of the
difference k∗n/n−α, illustrating that k∗n/n converges to α at rate approximately O(n−r) for
a fractional power r. Increments of n in all plots are chosen such as to avoid rounding effects
related to the fact that k∗n must be integer. On a finer scale for n, there are oscillations (cf.
[32, Figure 3]) which however disappear in the large n limit.
the cut-off at a certain rank k∗n is optimal for the expected performance at target rank k.
A formula (recalled below) for k∗n was found in [32], and it is also noted that k
∗
n ≥ k, with
k∗n > k unless k or k/n are small. For drift µ > 0, a cut-off is again optimal, but the exact
location of the cut-off is not known, whereas for µ < 0, the optimal shape can look smoother
than the sharp cut-off. In this section, we numerically compare the n-player game with the
mean field limit for large n, focusing on µ = 0 in order to have an exact result available for
finite n.
We recall from [32, Proposition 3.11] that the optimal normalized reward for the expected
k-th rank performance in the n-player game with µ = 0 is the cut-off at k∗n (i.e., Ri = 1/k
∗
n
for i ≤ k∗n and Ri = 0 for i > k∗n), where k∗n is determined as
k∗n = max
{







, φ(k, l) :=
(2n − k − l)!(k + l − 2)!
(n− l)!(l − 1)! .














If we scale k proportionally to n by fixing k/n ≈ α ∈ (0, 1), we can compare the optimal
cut-off ratio k∗n/n with the mean field optimal cut-off α. In the numerical example, we
consider the median performance; i.e., α = 0.5. A similar behavior can be observed for
other choices of α.
Figure 1 shows that k∗n/n converges to α as n → ∞. The convergence is rather slow;
e.g., for n = 1024, the optimal cut-off rank is still more than 9% larger than the mean-field
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Using the optimal cut-off k *n
Using the mean field cut-off
























Figure 2: Red circles correspond to the mean field proxy (cut-off at rank αn or ratio α),
blue stars correspond to the exact n-player optimizer (cut-off at rank k∗n or ratio k
∗
n/n).
Here α = 0.5 and x0 = 1. (a) Performance of the mean field proxy diverges from the
optimal design given by k∗n. (b) Median player’s performance for all cut-off schemes when
n = 24, 26, 28, 210. As n increases, the blue and red points converge in the horizontal
direction but nevertheless diverge in the vertical direction.
optimum. This already suggests that using the mean field optimal design as a proxy for the
n-player design may be problematic at least for moderate n.
Next, we consider the quality of the mean field proxy from the point of view of the prin-
cipal: we fix the optimal design R∗ from the mean field setting (Theorem 4.1) and compare
the resulting expected performance in the n-player game with the performance (5.10) of
the exact optimizer given by k∗n. For comparison, we mention that the analogous question
was considered in the Poissonian model of [31], for the same performance functional of the
principal, and there the mean field proxy was shown to be O(1/n)-optimal for the n-player
design problem.
Figure 2 (a) shows not only that the performance of the proxy may be significantly inferior
for finite n, but indeed that the performances diverge as n → ∞, with the exact solution
performing twice as well. The performance of the exact solution converges to the optimal
performance in the mean field model as stated in Theorem 4.1, x∗α = h
−1(1/α) = 2x0, but
the performance of the proxy does not.
Figure 2 (b) plots the same data points for some values of n, together with curves showing
the performance of any cut-off strategy as a function of the cut-off location. For larger n, the
curves are increasingly steep in a left neighborhood of the maximum: the vertical distance
between the data points increases even though the horizontal distance decreases. In other
words, the performance of R∗ is increasingly inferior despite the cut-off location approxi-
mating the optimal location.
The reason lies in the lack of smoothness of the mean field game. Indeed, we know that
the equilibrium distribution F ∗n induced by R
∗ in the n-player game converges weakly to
the mean field equilibrium F ∗ which is a two-point distribution (Theorems 5.1 and 4.1).




for large n, the distribution is still smooth with connected support for finite n, so that the
(1− α)-quantile stretches far beyond x∗α, causing the inferior performance.
We emphasize that the reason for the poor quality of the proxy observed here is very
different from the knife-edge phenomenon leading to the negative result in Theorem 5.4, and
quite possibly more relevant to applications.
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